Discourse and politics of migration in Italy
The production and reproduction of ethnic dominance and exclusion

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This introductory essay aims at offering an overview of the historical, demographic and economic dimensions of migration in Italy – as well as of Italian politics and migration-related legislation. Based on statistics, analysis and reports, and drawing on existing Italian and international literature on immigration-related issues, the paper highlights the profile of Italy’s migrant groups as well as the role they have been playing in the country’s labour market over time. The paper analyses key migration-related legislation showing that Italian immigration policies have been basically focused on ex post regularizations, control of new legal entries and repression of irregular ones. The increasing criminalization and securitization of immigration supported by right-wing parties and the most relevant features of public debate on immigration in Italy are highlighted.

Keywords: Migration; public discourse; politics; legislation; exclusion

1. Introduction

The spread of explicit and implicit forms of xenophobia, racism and discrimination directed at migrants is being more and more documented in international research studies with regard to the emergence of social and political movements which support anti-immigration positions and their growing cross-national diffusion in many European countries (see EUMC 2001, 2002, 2006; Rydgren 2003a; Wodak 2008). European public opinion has responded to immigration flows in diverse ways ranging from acceptance to prejudice, discrimination, and violence (FRA Annual Report 2010). Indeed, prejudice and discrimination directed at immigrants are widespread phenomena across Europe, as documented by several cross-European surveys (see Eurobarometer 2007; Demos 2011, 2012).
Immigration has been one of the most important issues in extreme right-wing discourse, where the principle of ‘national preference’ is overtly supported, implying the exclusion of foreign ‘Others’ on all social, economic, and political levels (Rydgren 2004). During the past two decades, the extreme right has re-emerged as an electoral force in Western Europe, as evidenced by the presence of many parties such as the Republikaner in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Swedish Democrats, the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People’s party.1 Often termed ‘radical right’ or ‘the new right’, these parties do not fit easily into traditional political divides. What they share is a fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called ‘ethno-pluralist doctrine’) and anti-political-establishment populism (Rydgren 2008). All these parties have consistently been mobilising against immigration and multiculturalism:

“Their program is directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values. They generally view individual rights as secondary to the goals of the nation. They also tend to be populists in accusing elites of putting internationalism ahead of the nation and of putting their own narrow self-interests and various special interests ahead of the interest of the people. Hence, the new radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism.”

(Rydgren 2007: 242–243)

By employing an ethno-pluralist ideology, extreme right-wing parties claim the right of European national cultures to protect their national/cultural identities against several threats, of which the alleged ‘invasion’ of immigrants is the most important. Indeed, frames linking immigration to criminality and social unrest have shown to be particularly effective discursive strategies to gain voter support for the extreme right (Rydgren 2008).

As Wodak (2003, 2007, 2008) argues, the extreme right has adopted more and more subtle forms of racism, and there is considerable evidence that they are being “normalised” at all levels of discourse. Reisigl and Wodak (2000: 275) define racism as follows:

“Racism is based on the hierarchising construction of groups of persons which are characterised as communities of descent and which are attributed specific collective, naturalised or biologised traits that are considered to be almost invariable. These traits are primarily related to biological features, appearance, cultural practices, customs, traditions, language or socially stigmatised ancestors. They are – explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly – evaluated negatively, and this judgement is more or less in accord with hegemonic views. That is,
language practices, cultural traits, traditions, and customs come to represent ‘race’ in hegemonic discourse in an ‘almost invariable pseudo-causal connection’ between biological, social, and cultural traits.”

According to this definition, racism does not only consist of white supremacist ideologies of race, or only aggressive, overt, or blatant discriminatory acts. Racism also involves “the everyday, mundane, negative opinions, attitudes and ideologies and the seemingly subtle acts and conditions of discrimination against minorities” (van Dijk 1993: 5).

This “new” racism is not expressed in overtly racist or neo-fascist terms: anti-immigrant positions are supported and justified by arguments having to do with protecting jobs, eliminating abuse of welfare benefits, or cultural incompatibilities. This new form of racism, which Taguieff (1988) calls ‘racisme différencialiste’ and Wieviorka (1998) calls ‘racisme culturel’, is not based on biology and hierarchy, but on culture and difference. This new racism stresses the incompatible differences between culturally defined ethnic groups which are described in cultural terms without specifically mentioning race or referring to overtly racial criteria. Schmidt (2002: 154) puts this point clearly: “A new racism has developed in recent decades in which specific cultural forms have come to signify racialized identities.” Whereas old racism aimed at subordination, the ethno-pluralist doctrine basically aims at expulsion.

As Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009: 1–2) point out,

“The move away from overt neo-fascist discourse has in fact allowed these parties to expand their electoral support as populist nationalist parties. But paradoxically this has led to an increase in racist discourse (…) racism now often takes more pervasive, diffuse forms (…) There is considerable evidence of a normalization of “othering” in political discourse, and there is much to indicate that this is also occurring at all levels of discourse, ranging from the media, political parties, and institutions to everyday life.”

Extensive research in the critical discourse analysis tradition has focused on the crucial role exerted by political elites and the diffusion and legitimation of both overt and covert forms of xenophobia and racist discourse over time: “because of their control over public discourse, media and communication, the elites, and hence also the political elites, play a special role in the formation of public opinion about immigration and other ethnic issues” (Wodak & van Dijk 2000:9). As a consequence, racism is now a process fluently integrated in everyday life, and ‘everyday racism adapts to cultural arrangements, norms and values while operating through the structures of power in society’ (Essed 2000:44).
Taking the Italian case as a starting point, this issue aims to provide some understanding of the many socio-political, historical and discursive processes involved in the production, reproduction and legitimization of racism, ethnic dominance and exclusion at different levels: from political and media to institutional and everyday discourses and practices.

2. Migration in Italy: An overview

2.1 Historical, demographic and economic aspects of migration in Italy

In recent years the number of migrants present in Italy has continued to rise steadily. In a relatively short period of time, the foreign population has become one of the highest in the European Union. In line with what has been happening in almost all European countries, immigration is now fairly well consolidated and immigration patterns are at an advanced stage, as shown by the presence of a large and growing share of second generation migrants.

The beginning of migratory processes in Italy is generally identified with the oil crisis of 1973, when European countries that traditionally imported labor adopted more restrictive entry policies (see Colombo & Sciortino 2004). Between the 1991 and 2001 censuses, the number of immigrants was three times higher, going from 356,000 to more than 1 million. On 1st January 2011 the number of foreign citizens reached 4,563,000, totalling 7.5% of the total population (ISTAT Report, 1st January 2011). The great majority of resident immigrants are concentrated in Central and Northern Italy. At the regional level, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna and Lazio have the highest number of foreigners. In absolute terms Rome, Milan and Turin have always been the main poles of attraction: in 2010 the number of foreign residents in these cities amounted to 268,996, 199,322 and 122,946 respectively.

At the same time, Italy has been constantly hosting a large irregular foreign population working in the underground economy (Reyneri 1998: 2004). The presence of large numbers of flexible and low-paid migrant workers has become an important structural component of the Italian labour market and economy, replacing to some extent more traditional south–north intra-Italian migration. According to unofficial estimates, in 2005, 6.1% of GDP was generated by immigrants. The 2010 ISTAT labour force survey showed that approximately 10% of workers in the country were foreigners, compared to 3.1% according to the 2001 census. The increase in foreign employment in industry is an extremely important element in the evolution of immigration. In many areas of the industrialized Centre-North, immigrant workers are employed in manufacturing, while construction is a main area of employment for immigrant workers throughout
the country (Macioti & Pugliese 2003). Domestic work of different types remains one of the most important areas of immigrant participation in the labour market. According to Bonifazi (2007), such pull factors should remain valid in the coming years.

Regarding the overall role of immigration in the national labour market, a recent study has come to the conclusion that there are greater complementarities than competition between national and migrant labour: “In a segmented labour market such as Italy’s, where large pockets of unemployment coexist with difficulties in finding labour (…), non EU workers do “low quality” jobs rejected by Italian workers” (Brandolini et al. 2005: 261).

2.2 The political context and migration-related legislation

For a long time, Italy has been unable to establish effective programs for the legal entry of foreign workers: the management of foreign labour has consequently been mostly done through mass amnesties (called sanatorie). The great majority of current foreign residents have acquired legal status only through ex-post regularization programs. As a consequence, most of the legal foreign population has experienced at least a period of irregular residence and irregular work.

In the early 1970s, Italy was essentially open to migration flows because of the absence of any specific legislation regulating the entry of foreign workers or establishing the conditions under which they could legally reside in the country. As in other Southern European countries, immigration was initially expected to be a transitory phenomenon. This assumption was based on the hypothesis that this phenomenon was mainly caused by a worsening of social and economic conditions in the originating countries, and did not take into consideration the fact that Italy's domestic labour demand might continue to attract migrants.

The role played by this demand for labour was initially underestimated; in the following decade, the increasing segmentation of labour markets yielded a significant increase in second-class job opportunities – i.e. precarious and badly paid jobs that the national labour force refused to do, and were carried out by the immigrant labour force (Bonifazi 2007). When, in the second half of the 1980s, immigration started to be defined as a social phenomenon deserving policy attention, two interconnected problems emerged: the presence of a sizeable number of undocumented foreigners already settled in the country, and the need to introduce rules to manage new arrivals. As Sciortino (2009: 11) points out, “the triplet absorbing the irregular population/making possible new legal entries/repressing new irregular entries is the defining orthodoxy of Italian immigration debate.”

The first bill of law attempting to regulate the development of immigration flows in Italy was Statute no. 943 of 30 December 1986 according to which entry
and work permits could only be issued when it had been established that there were not enough Italian workers to fill specific jobs. The law also introduced the first regularisation of illegal immigrants and granted basic civil and social rights to foreign workers with legal status, establishing equal access to health care, public housing and education. However, “no financial resources were explicitly allocated to these policies, thus producing a striking discrepancy between the principles underlying the Act and its actual implementation” (Zincone & Caponio 2005: 2).

In February 1990, a second Immigration Act, the so-called Martelli law (Statute no. 39) passed. This law did not depart from an essentially emergency-driven management of immigration: integration measures were inadequate and were limited in practice to the creation of the first reception centres. Moreover, although Italy’s European partners had been asking for stricter control of clandestine immigration, the law only made partial provision for such controls (see Zincone & Di Gregorio 2002).

The collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes led to continual arrivals throughout the 1990s, especially from Albania and the former Yugoslavia. From a transitory phenomenon, immigration was definitely redefined as an emergency issue that needed to be somehow faced and regulated. The early 1990s can be regarded as a period of emergency policy, as demonstrated by the ad hoc provisions adopted to host the influx of refugees from Albania, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In addition, the criteria informing the policies of the European Union had to be fulfilled: Italy signed the Schengen Agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.

A new legalisation law was passed, named the Dini Decree after the standing Prime Minister at the time, attached to Legislative Decree no. 489 of 18 November 1995. This new legalisation allowed for the regularisation of 248,501 illegal immigrants and introduced more severe measures against the smuggling and trafficking of immigrants.

The first systematic Italian Immigration Law, known as the Turco-Napolitano Act after the standing Minister of Social Affairs and Minister of the Interior in the centre-left government, was passed in 1998. As Zincone and Caponio (2005) point out, the Turco-Napolitano Act had four main purposes: (1) preventing and combating illegal entry; (2) regulating new flows of foreign workers; (3) promoting the integration of immigrants holding a valid residence permit; and (4) granting basic individual rights to illegal immigrants. In order to prevent illegal entry, the law established special administrative detention centres where “undocumented immigrants were to be temporarily detained while waiting for the completion of the expulsion procedure” (Zincone & Caponio 2005: 4).

The regulation of immigration flows was central to the Turco-Napolitano law. Legal entry on the basis of annual quotas was facilitated by the introduction of
'sponsorship': a temporary permit could be issued to foreigners willing to seek a job in Italy, provided that they were sponsored by Italian citizens or foreigners legally living in the country, regional or local authorities, trade unions or recognised voluntary associations. In order to promote integration, the Turco-Napolitano Law granted foreigners who had been in Italy legally for at least five years the right to apply for a permanent residency card. A National Fund was also set up to finance integration measures promoted by regional and local authorities. For the first time, self-employed foreign workers were also allowed to regularize their legal status.

Meanwhile, the political discussion about immigration was becoming steadily harsher in tone. Centre-right parties set their agenda on immigration during the political campaign prior to the 2001 general election, with a strong focus on the alleged *laissez-faire* approach to illegal immigration adopted by the centre-left coalition. The heterogeneous ‘Casa delle Liberta’ (CdL, House of Freedoms) coalition that won the 2001 general election comprised four centre-right parties: Forza Italia (FI) led by Silvio Berlusconi, the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale (AN) led by Gianfranco Fini; the northern-based regional populist party of the Lega Nord led by Umberto Bossi and the Centro Cristiano Democratico–Cristiani Democratici Uniti (Ccd–Cdu), the more direct inheritors of the once dominant Christian Democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) (see Geddes 2008).

The electoral success of the new centre-right coalition in 2001 had important effects on migration policies leading to the new Bossi-Fini law (Statute no. 189 of 2 July 2002). This law aimed to provide better management of migration flows and more effective prevention of clandestine immigration. As Zincone and Caponio (2005) point out, the Bossi-Fini law had two main purposes: (1) to link new residency permits more strictly to employment requirements, favouring temporary jobs and discouraging permanent settlement; (2) to combat illegal entry. The first one is clearly signalled, for instance, by the abolition of sponsorship and the shortening of validity periods for various staying permits. As for the second purpose, the Bossi-Fini law introduced/reinforced some particularly repressive measures, such as mandatory imprisonment of foreigners who fail to comply with an order to leave the country after being found without a residence permit or with an expired permit; and arrest and immediate escorting to the border following a simple endorsement by a judge, without any hearing or possibility of defence. Both these provisions were ruled to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and had to be attenuated considerably by the government.

Despite the restrictive approach of the Bossi-Fini law and the harsh conservative rhetoric of the right-wing parties during their political campaign, a new amnesty was introduced which allowed for the regularisation of over 634,000 illegal immigrants, almost equal to the total number of foreigners regularised by the four previous amnesties.
The key immigration measures introduced by the centre-right with the Bossi–Fini law have been regarded in a number of ways: as implying a further weakening of migrants’ legal status (Pugliese 2006), as harsh and repressive (Einaudi 2007), as discriminatory (Pepino 2002) and racist (Rivera 2003), or as a far more ambiguous mix of extremism and implicit moderation (Colombo & Sciortino 2003).

After the centre-left Prodi government came into power after the April 2006 elections a decree law on migration flows (Decreto flussi) was passed which enabled 350,000 immigrants to be regularly employed; the EU directives on family reunion and long-term residents were implemented, a bill to revise the law on citizenship and another to modify the Bossi-Fini law were proposed. In 2006, the Prodi government decided to issue a second decree on immigration flows which allowed all 540,000 foreigners who had applied to enter the country for economic reasons, to be regularly employed. The effects of this measure were temporary, considering that at the beginning of 2008 the number of irregular immigrants was estimated at 650,000. The fall of the Prodi Government at the beginning of 2008 held up the approval of two measures presented by the executive regarding naturalization and immigration.

In 2008, under the centre-right coalition guided by Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s upper house of parliament passed a controversial security bill which made illegal immigration a punishable offence. The so-called “security package” (Pacchetto sicurezza) – which was made definite in July 2009 (L.94/2009) – was intended to reinforce the regulatory framework, and clearly criminalised irregular immigration. The law also allowed citizen anti-crime patrols in towns and cities, and tripled (from two to six months) the amount of time that illegal immigrants could be detained in holding centres. The measures, especially the criminalisation of would-be immigrants, have drawn criticism from civil rights organizations including Amnesty international, as well as Italy’s centre-left opposition and the Catholic Church.

2.3 Public debate on migration in Italy

As in many European countries, migration has commonly been regarded as “a tidal wave of desperate people fleeing poverty and warfare at home trying to enter the elusive European El Dorado” (de Haas 2008: 1305). The Italian political elites and media have played a crucial role in the spreading and legitimating of both overt and covert forms of xenophobia and racist discourse over time (Dal Lago 1998; Maneri 1998). Indeed, politicians and journalists have commonly employed terms like ‘massive invasion’ and ‘plague’ to describe the phenomenon. The prevailing images used when talking about immigration have been that of a “threat”
or that of “an invading and besieging army”, and immigrants were identified as “clandestine”, “irregular”, “illegal” or “undocumented” (ter Wal 1991, 1996, 2000; Quassoli, this issue). The economic role of foreign workers has generally been left in the background, while issues such as border control and judicial treatment of illegal immigrants have been at the forefront of public discourse (political, media, and institutional discourse). Two main themes have been afforded the greatest prominence in the public debate on immigration in Italy: the regulation of immigration flows and illegal immigration.

As happened in other European countries (see Wodak 2007, 2008; Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009), Italian anti-immigrant positions have also been supported and justified by arguments such as protecting jobs, eliminating abuses of welfare benefits or preserving cultural identity. Over time, public discourse has continued to focus on new arrivals and on the security and cultural threats that migrants allegedly pose (Dal Lago 1999; Geddes 2008; Maneri 1998). As Clough Marinaro and Walston (2010:6) point out,

“Despite the fact that most illegal immigrants arrive with tourist visas and overstay, the images of boatloads of clandestini, highly diverse groups of migrants, many of them refugees, dominate the media as do images of immigrant protesters in various cities. This focus on recent migrants and the construction of their otherness within Italian society serves to perpetuate the myth of a clear split between a unified national culture and identity, and ‘them’, the foreigners.”

Although in recent years Italy has received large numbers of migrants compared to other western European countries and is still attracting new migrants, the public discourse continues to ignore the fact that many of them are long-term residents and have been playing an important role in the Italian labour market.

During the past two decades, the extreme right has re-emerged as an electoral force in Italy, just as in many other European countries. Similarly to what happened in other European countries, in Italy it was the extreme right, notably the Lega Nord (since its first electoral success at the beginning of the ’90s), that put immigration at the centre of the political agenda and defined the terms of the debate under the heading of populist slogans. Over time, the Lega Nord has constantly mobilised against immigration and multiculturalism, both by promoting an ethnic view of citizenship (jus sanguinis) and opposing the idea of residential citizenship (jus soli).5

The essential part of this politicization process is the fact that immigration has increasingly been a topic on the electoral and political agenda. Moreover, this increased interest is expressed by a switch in legislative focus from integration policies to control policies vis-à-vis migration flows and immigrants, with the result that immigration has increasingly been constructed as a law and order issue
in political and public discourse. Frames linking immigration to criminality and social unrest have shown to be particularly effective discourse strategies to gain voter support for the extreme right in Italy as in other EU countries (Biorcio 2010; Rydgren 2008).

On the one hand, discourse within the moderate political parties in Italy over the last two decades has been very much influenced by the increasing share of the Lega Nord. Both the moderate right and moderate left started to exploit the Lega’s ideology, albeit in a less extremist, more coded rhetorical agenda. As Bigot and Fella (2008: 305) suggest,

“Policy on restricting entry to Italy usually has been formed against a backdrop of political debate that has been shaped in part by the exclusionist discourse of the (northern) regionalist populist Lega Nord (and sometimes that of the post-fascist National Alliance, AN). Using Zincone’s typology (Zincone 2006:351–2), these actors can be said to have taken a mixture of repressive-legalitarian (stressing the need to combat illegal immigration and strictly control legal immigration) and identitarian positions (expressing concern about the threat to national and cultural identity posed by immigration).”

On the other hand, the centre-left and the Catholic parties, together with pro-immigrant associations, have tended to support humanitarian positions, focusing on the need to respect the human dignity of immigrants, provide welfare services and promote their social integration. At the same time, both centre-left and centre-right parties have essentially accepted “the functionalist case for immigration (necessary in terms of labour market shortages) – a position also held by key economic actors such as employer associations” (Bigot & Fella 2008: 306).

Noteworthy is the absence of a radical pro-immigration stance in the Italian political discourse. The emphasis on legality and control that characterizes most political debates has been shared not only among right-wing parties, but also among left-wing supporters. As Zincone (2006: 348) suggests, “Although policy paradigms diverge, at least in the case of the major parties in the two political alliances, they agree on one point: they condemn clandestine and illegal immigration, and both coalitions have adopted special measures to combat it”. Only members of the extreme left, e.g. Rifondazione Comunista, have attempted to redirect the debate and the representation of migrants in terms of integration and socio-cultural issues (Maneri 1998; Riva, Colombo, Montali 2008).

In terms of their respective stances on immigration, both the Lega Nord and A.N. have been characterized as anti-immigration, with A.N. being seen as the ‘opportunistic right’ and the Lega as an ‘ethno-national’ party (Messina 2007). The opportunistic right comprises parties that pursue anti-immigration strategies motivated by the desire to win votes, where these policies are woven into a larger critique of the existing order. Such parties also have a ‘pliable’ ideological
identity which highlights the importance of the party leadership in the ideological positioning of the party (Fella & Ruzza 2006).

Just as in other European countries (see Rydgren 2008), Italian right-wing parties have framed immigration as a problem in four different ways: first, as a threat to ethno-national identity; second, as a major cause of criminality and other kinds of social insecurity; third, as a cause of unemployment; and fourth, as abusing the generosity of the welfare state.

As Rydgren (2008: 746) points out, “Only the first two of these frames can be treated as a manifestation of the ethnopluralist doctrine (i.e. that different ethnicities should not ‘mix’ lest cultural specificities disappear and insecurity and crime increase), whereas the last two can be treated as part of a welfare chauvinist doctrine in which immigrants and ‘natives’ are depicted as competing for limited economic resources”. In such a supposed conflict situation, immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors and right-wing parties have supported the idea of ‘national preference’: giving ‘natives’ priority in jobs, housing, health care and so on – a proposal that can be characterized as ‘reversed affirmative action’ (e.g. Zaslove 2004; Rydgren 2003a, 2003b).

Left- and right-wing discourse and policies on immigration in Italy have been analysed by Zincone (2006), who describes 3 paradoxes: (a) the continuity between centre-left and centre-right policies; (b) the discontinuity between policy paradigms and continuity of actual policies; and (c) the discrepancy between public anti-immigration rhetoric and the mass regularisation of immigrants. The first paradox refers to the relative continuity between centre-left and centre-right immigration policies, “regardless of changes of government, and despite the fact that attitudes to immigration are a characteristic feature and a source of bitter conflict between the competing coalitions” (Zincone 2006: 347). The second paradox concerns the fact that “the main difference between centre-left and centre-right in Italy relates far more to proclaimed strategies and values than to legislation” (Zincone 2006: 348). The third paradox pertains to “the discrepancy between public rhetoric and public action regarding illegal immigration” (Zincone 2006: 348).

With regard to such discrepancies between political rhetoric and immigration policies in Italy, Geddes (2008) highlights how apparent contradictions, paradoxes and ambiguities can actually be functional elements of immigration politics (and more generally of thorny social and political issues), and how alleged policy failings need to be related to the political processes that generate them as well as the political pay-offs that often occur within these processes. According to Geddes (2008: 305), party systems and governmental variables underpin these apparent paradoxes and contradictions: “While the gap between rhetoric and reality could be presented as paradoxical or as some kind of puzzle, it is really
nothing of the sort. The ‘gap’ is actually a standard outcome across Europe (and other liberal states) (...) and is suggestive of political and institutional limitations on state capacity to regulate international migration”.

Overall, public discourse on immigration in Italy has focused on the perceived differences, deviance and threat represented by migrants. Migration has been framed as a problem, whereas the social, cultural and political issues raised by the increasing presence of migrants in the country have evolved over time. A negative representation of migrants has been persistently fostered in political and media discourses, where they have been indexed into categories aimed at legitimising their exclusion on all social, economic, and political levels.

2.4 Research on immigration

In Italy, immigration has so far been studied in its structural aspects, which are of sociological, political and legal interest – these being the main frameworks in which it has been researched, even internationally (see Zincone 2006; Colombo & Sciortino 2004; Geddes 2008). In these studies, Italy is generally considered an exemplary case of a country that has rapidly been transformed from an emigration pole to a host country. It is suggested that, on the one hand, this sudden transformation has raised socio-economic and political issues that government coalitions were not ready to deal with; on the other hand, “from the late 1980s onwards, reactions among the domestic population towards immigrants from non-EU countries has grown increasingly hostile” (Triandafyllidou 2000: 374).

Research into immigration in Italy began to gain ground in the mid-1980s, and at first it was essentially concerned with inflow composition and entry into the labour market. These studies were essentially of a first- and second-generation type (Zincone & Caponio 2005), and were designed to investigate why a traditional emigration country, still characterized by high unemployment rates, especially in the Southern regions, had turned into an immigration country. The first explanations emphasized the role of ‘push factors’, i.e. factors which push a person away from or encourages a person to leave his or her current residence, city, state or country, such as lack of jobs, extreme poverty or war (Calvanese 1983; Calvanese & Pugliese 1988). However, later studies focused more on the segmented structure of the Italian labour market and the underground economy, which still plays a crucial role in Italy, showing that these two elements represent strong ‘pull factors’ attracting foreign immigrants (see Bonifazi 2007).

As immigration evolved, research addressed more and more specific aspects of the phenomenon, for example the participation of migrants in the labour market (Ambrosini 1999; Pugliese 2000; Reyneri 1998, 2004), integration (Caponio 2002, 2003, 2004; Sciortino & Colombo 2002), second generation

Since the start of the public debate on immigration in Italy, there has been some interest in analyzing it. The research available thus far regarding the Italian press is based on systematic studies of articles that appeared over a rather brief period of time, and often in reference to a single event (Palomba & Righi 1992; Riccio 1997; Mai 2002); on the cross-section of a few weeks for a number of years (Mansoubi 1990; Triandafyllidou 2000); or on the sampling of a few weeks in one or more well-defined time periods (Maneri 1998). These studies present some conceptual and methodological limitations due to the traditional content analytic perspective which they adopt; this notwithstanding they allow for a reconstruction of the evolution of the public debate on immigration in Italy (see Marletti 1991; Balbo & Manconi 1992; Sciortino & Colombo 2004). For instance, many authors identify the end of the 1980s as the crisis point of the Italian media’s facile antiracism (Balbo & Manconi 1992; Faso 2008). According to Marletti (1991), this is shown in the way the media tended to cover incidents of intolerance towards foreigners during this period, with the goal of highlighting and criticizing these acts. According to Mansoubi (1990), who studied the local newspaper La Nazione from 1978 to 1987, one of the major changes in this period is the increasing association of immigrants with deviance and criminality. Another study of local newspapers from Emilia Romagna in 1991 reveals a shift (considered positive by the author) to a more realistic and critical journalistic style that does not hide the difficulties of integration (Grossi 1995). Along the same lines, a study of some national newspapers identifies a drastic change in the issues dealt with by the press in the periods 1988–1989 and 1992–1993. The first period was marked by an emphasis on racism and xenophobia, the second by a growing concern with criminality and public order. The noticeable increase of news on immigrants and crime in the 1990s has been emphasized by various authors, who note a growing concern over security in the Italian public discourse (Maneri 1998; Dal Lago 1999). In 2009, a study of the local media in Genoa (Macciò 2009) shows that coverage of ‘second generations’ is massively concentrated on topics related to crime and urban safety, in line with stable trends within the Italian media when discussing migrants and minorities more generally. Again, typical of both local and national-level mainstream media is the tendency to give very little voice to non-institutional and non-Italian actors (see Montali et al. this issue).

2.5 Research agenda

Processes of racialization and criminalization of migrants have substantially characterized discourses about migration in Italy over time and they deserve to
be analysed in depth going beyond traditional content analytic procedures. The question of how foreigners have been represented in discourse can be considered a key element for understanding some of the many socio-political, historical and discursive processes involved in the production, reproduction and legitimization of racism, ethnic dominance and exclusion at different levels: from political and media discourse to institutional and everyday discourse and practices. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 1) suggest, “racist opinions and beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse […] through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimized.”

Discourse about ‘foreigners’ can be regarded as a symbolic resource which is used in group identity negotiation to maintain established social hierarchies (Gotsbachner 2001). ‘Others’ (i.e. foreigners) are viewed as ‘different’ and, in many cases, as ‘outsiders’ or even as ‘enemies’ (Savic 2005). The meanings associated with this ‘foreigner’ figure, intended not only as a legal category but also as a political category, gravitate around the notions of ‘strangeness’ and ‘lack of belonging’ to the national community. As Richardson (2004: 33) argues, the reproduction of racism in discourse is pervasive: “If racism is reproduced through discourse, then racism will be in evidence at all three levels of discursive communication – social practices, discursive practices, and the texts themselves – in ways which are integrated and mutually self-supporting”.

Just like in other European countries, public discourse on immigration in Italy is characterized by an increasing politicization of immigration. The term “politization” is taken to mean the steady rise in importance of the immigration question, until it becomes a central part of the political agenda (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009). It was the far-right, and especially the Lega Nord (the Italian secessionist party), to put immigration at the centre of the Italian political agenda since its first electoral success at the beginning of the ’90s, thereby defining the terms of the debate under the heading of populist slogans (see Colombo and Richardson in this issue). The term is therefore used to indicate the continuing increase in legislative and public interest in the legal and security aspects of immigration. The result is also a progressive “juridification” (Besselink 2006), that is to say the jurisdiction and decision-making powers regarding immigration and its associated problems are gradually transferred from the political sphere (legitimate) to the legal sphere (functional). As Holm (2002: 9) suggests,

“The above-mentioned terms [juridification] construct a border between the legal space of Europe and the rest of the world. The “juridification” discourse deepens the above-mentioned binarity by opposing the concept of “legal immigrant” to its logical counter-concepts: the illegal, the “clandestine”, the “sans-papier” (…) The “juridification” discourse has thus a built-in criminalization of the “extracommunitarian” immigrants”.
3. The issue in outline

This issue combines various perspectives from the fields of sociology, social psychology and critical discourse analysis in order to provide an in-depth analysis of how discourse and politics on migration developed in Italy. Taking a historical and diachronic perspective, the aim is to cast light on both the past and the current situation and debate on the increasing criminalisation and securitisation of migration, and on the ever-growing production and reproduction of exclusionary discourses and practices in Italy. Across the papers, these processes are addressed at different but interrelated levels, ranging from political, media and institutional discourse to everyday life.

Although the data stem from the Italian context, the issue might be of potential interest for all who are concerned with xenophobia, ethnic discrimination and racism and, in particular, with the role exerted by symbolic elites in the production and reproduction of anti-immigrant discourse, the relationship between discourse and policy, and how public discourse shapes citizens’ representations of migrants. The studies presented in this issue provide considerable evidence that exclusionary discourses and practices rest upon pervasive forms of new racism informing both the representation of ethnic groups and minorities in public debate, and social practices within politics, institutions and everyday life. The papers offer theoretical and methodological insights into the analysis of these exclusionary discourses and practices, covering both dimensions and showing how they inform one another.

In our paper, “Continuity and change in populist anti-immigrant discourse: An analysis of the visual propaganda of the Lega Nord”, John Richardson and I analyse how continuity and chance intertwine in the anti-immigrant discourse that has so far been at the centre of the campaigning of the Italian populist secessionist party known as the Lega. Issues of security, national prosperity and safeguard of traditional cultural values have been overtly supported by the Lega party over time, implying the exclusion of the foreign ‘Other’ on all social, economic, and political levels. The paper offers an analysis of the Lega’s visual propaganda from different campaigns. This analysis is twofold: first, a brief multimodal analysis of the visual dimensions of the texts is presented, concentrating predominantly on the use of photographs, page layout and typography, and this is followed by an analysis of the linguistic content of the leaflets, paying particular attention to referential strategies and argumentative structure. Our analysis of the sampled posters shows an enduring basic antipathy to foreigners in the argumentative strategies of the Lega Nord which can only be described as racist in tone and in practice. Xenophobia and law and order policies have been taken up by the Lega, which can now be seen as the true embodiment of the Italian extreme right, as clearly highlighted by the strategy shift in the 2008 campaign. Here, arguments reminiscent
of the Nouvelle Droite’s ethno-pluralism are offered: in the interests of respecting cultural diversity, the Lega Nord argues that different national communities need to be kept separate, thereby inverting liberal values for the purpose of countering multiculturalism. A close examination of the electoral propaganda of the Lega and its development over time may help our understanding of how populist ideology has evolved and how xenophobia has spread in general. In this article we have used the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to investigate the explicit and indirect persuasive rhetorical and argumentative devices employed by the Lega to foster a fear of foreigners and convince voters of their potential danger. We suggest that through an in-depth examination of the linguistic content – including inter alia referential and predicative strategies, presuppositions and their significance to specific national and historic contexts – together with a careful analysis of the pictorial and visual content of the leaflets, the xenophobic, racist and exclusionary implications of anti-immigrant discourse can be fully highlighted.

In his paper, “Clandestino”: Institutional discourses and practices for the Control and Exclusion of Migrants in Contemporary Italy, Fabio Quassoli draws on his extensive research on immigration policies and control in Italy. He shows how and to what extent some institutional contexts (the police and the judicial system) have been reshaped by discourses and practices that focus on the distinction between documented (i.e. legal or regolari) and undocumented (i.e. illegal or irregolari) immigrants. The adjectives “clandestino” and “irregolare” – two synonyms for ‘undocumented immigrant’ that appeared in the public discourse at the end of the 1980s – achieved legal legitimisation since the first immigration law in 1986, and quickly became used to refer to a problem to be solved or a menace to contend with for those institutions involved in controlling immigration. As Quassoli points out, such a change generated a complex web of knowledge, discourses and practices that eventually produced the essential vocabulary and the hegemonic frameworks for public debates about immigration in Italy. It also stresses the need/urgency to cope with clandestine immigration both as a barycentre of politics and the basic strategy to reproduce the social order.

In their paper, “The representation of migrants in the Italian press: a study on the Corriere della Sera (1992–2009)”, Lorenzo Montali, Paolo Riva, Alessandra Frigerio and Silvia Mele analyze continuity and change in media discourses on immigration in Italy. Discourse is regarded as a means of reproduction and maintenance of a racist interpretation of the relationships among groups. The corpus consists of articles (a total of 6888) published by the leading Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera, between 1992 and 2009 – selected on the basis of the presence in the titles of the words “clandestine”, “immigrant”, “foreigner” and “non-EU foreigner”. This corpus is analyzed by integrating quantitative content analysis and qualitative analysis of lexical and semantic strategies (Van Dijk 2001), applied to a
Montali et al. show that discourse is characterised by a problematisation of the out-group on multiple levels. The most important of these – and the only one that remains constant over time – is the association of immigrants with different forms of crime and deviance. Alongside this, there are two main problematic issues, which correspond to two historical phases of the migratory phenomenon in Italy: at an early stage, in the period from 1992 to 2002, the difficulty of managing immigrant arrivals; and at a later stage, between 2003 and 2009, the problems related to the presence of foreign children in schools. In both cases, what emerges is the relevance of dramatising rhetorical strategies, the use of metaphors with a strongly negative valence, and the tendency to downplay themes that would be favourable to migrants – e.g. the reasons for immigration, the economic and cultural contribution of immigrants to the country, the everyday racism that they experience. Montali et al. suggest that the Italian media discourse is built according to themes and discursive strategies already identified by similar research conducted on the European media, indicating how this system of representations defines a common sense of cultural belonging and a shared construction of ethnic relations.

In her paper called “Imagined communities and othering process: discursive strategies of established Italian residents in a Milan city neighbourhood”, Roberta Marzorati explores and analyses the discursive strategies of established Italian residents when dealing with neighbours, shopkeepers and public space users of immigrant origin in daily interactions in a neighbourhood located in a semi-central area in the city of Milan. In particular it addresses the process of otherness construction as it is displayed in relation to the representation of the neighbourhood as the established Italian resident’s exclusive place and the imagination of a community of ‘us’. Discursive strategies about the nature of this place and who its legitimate users should be, and social practices of appropriation and control, are analysed in order to show the interrelation between the process of othering and the discursive construction of place identity. The article focuses on how the public discourse on immigration is shaped, re-shaped, and eventually contested by these actors in their daily life. The idea is that people often make use of a sedimented knowledge about others when dealing with specific situations, and such knowledge, i.e. the dominant discourse, can be contrasted in daily situations and face to face interactions. Nevertheless, when the logic of avoidance and exclusion prevail over that of encounter and reciprocal knowledge, this may lead to a halt of interactions and the exacerbation of urban conflicts. The author argues that such a situation is both the result of contextual elements and the role played by public discourse at the national and municipal level.

Finally, in their paper “The looking glass: from the citizen to the migrant in Italians’ naïve imagery, Anna Miglietta and Silvia Gattino discuss the concept
of citizenship both from a critical-theoretical point of view and in the light of the findings of a study conducted in Italy on the social representation of citizens and migrants. They show how the contemporary foreigner figure that we commonly know as ‘the migrant’ is a political and legal figure, but is also the result of a symbolic construction which is shaped through a social comparison process between citizens and non-citizens. The research aims to analyze how the thême of social recognition is objectified in everyday language, and to explore the characteristics attributed to the other in a plural society. The European political space has always implied attributing sovereignty to specific ethno-political groups thanks to the creation of internally homogeneous (or presumed such) national identities, and establishing the necessary criteria in order to define the most exclusive form of belonging, i.e. that of citizenship. This is the reason why it is often difficult to distinguish between forms of citizenship defined according to political and legal criteria, from those based on ethnic or cultural elements, as shown by current policies regarding the naturalization of ‘immigrants’. According to Miglietta and Gattino, the issue of citizenship highlights a specific form of the subjectivity-alterity relationship: subjectivity is tied up with the social and legal identity of citizens, which involves the acknowledgment, or the lack of acknowledgment of non-citizens.

Notes

1. Two dominant theories link immigration and attitudes toward immigration to the emergence of the new radical right as an electoral force. The first focuses on the alleged increase in popular xenophobia; the second is the so-called ‘ethnic competition theory’. According to the ethnic competition thesis, voters turn to the new radical right in order to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as in the labour market, housing and welfare benefits (Fennema 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Kriesi 1999).

2. The research is mainly based on data about residency permits, which allowed us to estimate certain legal aspects of immigration. As Colombo and Sciortino (2004) argue, a relevant methodological problem concerns expired residency permits that were not removed from the archives. On the basis of a revision of the data, the authors offer a different reconstruction of early immigration to Italy: “Legal immigration in Italy did not begin in 1970, but earlier (…) Italy, therefore, was not merely a second choice for immigrants who could not enter other countries (…) The phases of growth in the number of staying permits coincide with amnesties for the legalization of status (…) Waves of illegal immigration during the 1970s and the 1980s were only absorbed thanks to the amnesties of 1986 and 1990.” (p. 54–55).

3. The idea of a national planning program to regulate the entry of foreign workers was born at the end of the ’80s, and was introduced in the Italian legislation in 1990, with the so-called Martelli law (act. 39/90). For a long time, however, this part of the legislation was applied through yearly decrees allowing for the entry of a very limited number of foreign workers.
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Entries of irregular workers were tolerated for most of the ’90s, and undocumented migrants were periodically absorbed into the official labour market through an amnesty.

4. The so-called CPT(A), Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Accoglienza.

5. In her analysis, Andall (2007) has focused on the DS Party (Democratici di Sinistra), a mainstream left party, during their first period of national government in Italy. She seeks to establish whether the DS were able to veer immigration politics in Italy towards the ‘left’ while in government. Her analysis looks at their approach to the integration of labour migrants, focusing primarily on the political management of access to Italian citizenship and local voting rights. She claims that the anti-immigration activities of the Lega Nord inhibited the implementation of the DS’s stated policy intentions in matters of integration. As a consequence, left-right convergence occurred regarding immigration control, while left-right differentiation in relation to integration remained largely rhetorical.

6. Geddes (2008) has analysed immigration policy during the five years of centre-right government in Italy 2001–06 led by Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party.

References


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